Deadline is coming up and I have a ton of stuff to do today, but the judge in TC Memo 2014-35 pretty much nails all your arguments here to the wall. Speaking of arguing over the meaning of words, what do you think that “includes” means? Heh.
Have a good rest of your weekend and good luck with this.
we've already covered what the courts have said about the word "includes." but I'll put it here for others who missed it:
"[T]he verb "includes" imports a general class, some of whose particular instances are those specified in the definition." ~Helvering v Morgan's Inc, 293 U.S. 121, 126 fn. 1 (1934)
"[I]ncluding ... connotes simply an illustrative application of the general principle." ~Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 62 S.Ct. 1 U.S. (1941)
Right, which doesn’t mean “only”. You’re deciding that the section you mention, of which there are others that do also apply, excludes any not therein listed. That is what your argument hinges on and it is clearly a fallacy. If I say that I went several places, *including* the mall, that doesn’t mean I didn’t go also to BassPro. So just because the statute says that some people are *included* in a class of taxpayers that doesn’t mean others aren’t. There are other statutes that clearly contradict the claim that some people aren’t subject to tax simply because they aren’t listed in that section of the code.
We aren't talking about regular language here, we are talking about the administration of the law, which is why I'm quoting court cases. How you use the words "income" and "includes" has absolutely zero bearing on how the law and courts use those words.
And I never said it meant "only." Because that isn't what the courts say it means either.
You might read that Tax Court case I cited earlier. It explicitly goes into that and rejects your interpretation.
Judge’s opinion from TC Memo 2014-35:
“Defendant begins by asserting that Congress intended through the enactment of § 7343 to "limit the application of the title-wide definition of 'person' found at 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1)." He then argues that the use of the term "includes" in § 7343 is meant to provide illustrative examples of a "general class" of "persons" within the scope of this statutory definition. Because ordinary individuals do not fit within the "general class" described by § 7343 - a class that is typified by corporate officers and employees, as well as members and employees of partnerships -- Defendant surmises that such individuals cannot be deemed "persons" within the meaning of § 7343 (and hence under § 7206(1)).
This attempt at statutory construction fails at its initial premise. While Defendant states as ipse dixit that it is "unambiguously clear" and "immediately apparent" that § 7343 is intended to limit, and not supplement, the definition of "person" set forth at § 7701(a)(1), the most natural reading of these two definitions suggests otherwise. Under its plain terms, the definition of "person" set forth at § 7701(a)(1) governs throughout the tax code unless another provision "distinctly expresse[s]" otherwise or this definition would be "manifestly incompatible with the intent" of a code provision. Nothing in § 7343 can be construed as a "distinct[] express[ion]" of
an intent to override or supplant the § 7701(a)(1) definition of a "person." To the contrary, § 7343 reads quite naturally as a supplement to or clarification of this latter definition: § 7701(a)(1) provides that the term "person" "mean[s] and include[s] an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation," and § 7343 then builds upon this definition by specifying that it "includes" certain individuals who act on behalf of a corporation or partnership -- i.e., "an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs."
This harmonizing construction of § 7701(a)(1) and § 7343 also satisfies the specific dictate of the Internal Revenue Code that "[t]he term[] 'includes' . . . when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined." It would violate this code-mandated rule of statutory construction to conclude, as Defendant proposes, that the use of the word "includes" in § 7343 operates to exclude the entirety of the general definition of "person" set forth at § 7701(a)(1) -- i.e., individuals, trusts, estates, partnerships, associations, companies, and corporations -- and to wholly supplant this definition with a far more limited class consisting only of corporate officers and employees and members and employees of partnerships. * * * Thus, it is not only far more natural, but also better comports with § 7701(c), to construe § 7343 as building upon, and not overriding, the more general and broadly applicable definition of "person" found at § 7701(a)(1).
Not surprisingly, then, the courts have uniformly rejected the reading of "person" advocated by Defendant here.”
Okay, that specific reference doesn't exactly settle the issue because ultimately, they state, "Thus, it is not only far more natural, but also better comports with § 7701(c), to construe § 7343 as building upon, and not overriding, the more general and broadly applicable definition of "person" found at § 7701(a)(1)."
What they did not say is that "person" includes the common usage of the word or anything not already in the definition in Section 7701. So, it is still limited to what is expressly stated in the title.
Remember, we are dealing with the application of the law, so if terms with definitions are provided there is no precedent for assuming those terms mean the same as the commonly used word, otherwise, there would be no need to define them.
But let's take a closer look at the definition of "includes" in the code itself, because it's important we understand exactly how it applies to the code.
§7701. Definitions
(c) Includes and including
The terms "includes" and "including" when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.
That is LIMITING. What it does not say is, "shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the common usage of the word."
It says, "within the MEANING of the TERM DEFINED." That is specific. The terms are explicitly defined, and the word "includes" means that other similar things to the explicit definition, while not stated, are not excluded.
Here's more precedent, which is very important in the application of the law, in favor of that understanding:
- 27 CFR § 18.11 - Meaning of terms.
"When used in this part and in forms prescribed under this part, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof, terms shall have the meaning ascribed in this section [terms - this is key - shall have the meaning ascribed in THIS SECTION. these are very specific location instructions so that the law can be applied as precisely as possible].
Words in the plural form shall include the singular, and vice versa, and words importing the masculine gender shall include the feminine. The terms “includes” and “including” do not exclude things not enumerated which are in the same general class [similar to 7701(c) above but with 'same general class' qualifier instead of 'otherwise within the meaning of the term defined']."
here's another:
- 27 CFR § 447.11 - Meaning of terms.
"When used in this part [specific location] and in forms prescribed under this part [specific forms], where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof [we saw that exact phrase at 7701(a)], terms shall have the meanings ascribed in this section [same instructions as above]. Words in the plural form shall include the singular, and vice versa, and words imparting the masculine gender shall include the feminine. The terms “includes” and “including” do not exclude other things not enumerated which are in the same general class or are otherwise within the scope thereof." [shown here with the 'same general class' and 'within the scope thereof' qualifiers.]
So, look, I can do this all day. I've shown you a couple of court rulings and a couple of code references. I can go more, you tell me how many you need before you see a pattern.
I get it, legalese is difficult to parse. But I have a couple of decades of practice.
For you to claim that terms mean the same as the commonly used words is very naive. Even your example above proved my point.
Can you just imagine how incredibly chaotic it would be to even attempt to administer the vast library of laws and regulations without a very high attention to detail?
Deadline is coming up and I have a ton of stuff to do today, but the judge in TC Memo 2014-35 pretty much nails all your arguments here to the wall. Speaking of arguing over the meaning of words, what do you think that “includes” means? Heh.
Have a good rest of your weekend and good luck with this.
we've already covered what the courts have said about the word "includes." but I'll put it here for others who missed it:
"[T]he verb "includes" imports a general class, some of whose particular instances are those specified in the definition." ~Helvering v Morgan's Inc, 293 U.S. 121, 126 fn. 1 (1934)
"[I]ncluding ... connotes simply an illustrative application of the general principle." ~Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 62 S.Ct. 1 U.S. (1941)
Right, which doesn’t mean “only”. You’re deciding that the section you mention, of which there are others that do also apply, excludes any not therein listed. That is what your argument hinges on and it is clearly a fallacy. If I say that I went several places, *including* the mall, that doesn’t mean I didn’t go also to BassPro. So just because the statute says that some people are *included* in a class of taxpayers that doesn’t mean others aren’t. There are other statutes that clearly contradict the claim that some people aren’t subject to tax simply because they aren’t listed in that section of the code.
We aren't talking about regular language here, we are talking about the administration of the law, which is why I'm quoting court cases. How you use the words "income" and "includes" has absolutely zero bearing on how the law and courts use those words.
And I never said it meant "only." Because that isn't what the courts say it means either.
You might read that Tax Court case I cited earlier. It explicitly goes into that and rejects your interpretation.
Judge’s opinion from TC Memo 2014-35:
“Defendant begins by asserting that Congress intended through the enactment of § 7343 to "limit the application of the title-wide definition of 'person' found at 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1)." He then argues that the use of the term "includes" in § 7343 is meant to provide illustrative examples of a "general class" of "persons" within the scope of this statutory definition. Because ordinary individuals do not fit within the "general class" described by § 7343 - a class that is typified by corporate officers and employees, as well as members and employees of partnerships -- Defendant surmises that such individuals cannot be deemed "persons" within the meaning of § 7343 (and hence under § 7206(1)).
This attempt at statutory construction fails at its initial premise. While Defendant states as ipse dixit that it is "unambiguously clear" and "immediately apparent" that § 7343 is intended to limit, and not supplement, the definition of "person" set forth at § 7701(a)(1), the most natural reading of these two definitions suggests otherwise. Under its plain terms, the definition of "person" set forth at § 7701(a)(1) governs throughout the tax code unless another provision "distinctly expresse[s]" otherwise or this definition would be "manifestly incompatible with the intent" of a code provision. Nothing in § 7343 can be construed as a "distinct[] express[ion]" of
an intent to override or supplant the § 7701(a)(1) definition of a "person." To the contrary, § 7343 reads quite naturally as a supplement to or clarification of this latter definition: § 7701(a)(1) provides that the term "person" "mean[s] and include[s] an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation," and § 7343 then builds upon this definition by specifying that it "includes" certain individuals who act on behalf of a corporation or partnership -- i.e., "an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs."
This harmonizing construction of § 7701(a)(1) and § 7343 also satisfies the specific dictate of the Internal Revenue Code that "[t]he term[] 'includes' . . . when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined." It would violate this code-mandated rule of statutory construction to conclude, as Defendant proposes, that the use of the word "includes" in § 7343 operates to exclude the entirety of the general definition of "person" set forth at § 7701(a)(1) -- i.e., individuals, trusts, estates, partnerships, associations, companies, and corporations -- and to wholly supplant this definition with a far more limited class consisting only of corporate officers and employees and members and employees of partnerships. * * * Thus, it is not only far more natural, but also better comports with § 7701(c), to construe § 7343 as building upon, and not overriding, the more general and broadly applicable definition of "person" found at § 7701(a)(1).
Not surprisingly, then, the courts have uniformly rejected the reading of "person" advocated by Defendant here.”
Okay, that specific reference doesn't exactly settle the issue because ultimately, they state, "Thus, it is not only far more natural, but also better comports with § 7701(c), to construe § 7343 as building upon, and not overriding, the more general and broadly applicable definition of "person" found at § 7701(a)(1)."
What they did not say is that "person" includes the common usage of the word or anything not already in the definition in Section 7701. So, it is still limited to what is expressly stated in the title.
Remember, we are dealing with the application of the law, so if terms with definitions are provided there is no precedent for assuming those terms mean the same as the commonly used word, otherwise, there would be no need to define them.
But let's take a closer look at the definition of "includes" in the code itself, because it's important we understand exactly how it applies to the code.
§7701. Definitions
(c) Includes and including
The terms "includes" and "including" when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.
That is LIMITING. What it does not say is, "shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the common usage of the word."
It says, "within the MEANING of the TERM DEFINED." That is specific. The terms are explicitly defined, and the word "includes" means that other similar things to the explicit definition, while not stated, are not excluded.
Here's more precedent, which is very important in the application of the law, in favor of that understanding:
- 27 CFR § 18.11 - Meaning of terms.
"When used in this part and in forms prescribed under this part, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof, terms shall have the meaning ascribed in this section [terms - this is key - shall have the meaning ascribed in THIS SECTION. these are very specific location instructions so that the law can be applied as precisely as possible].
Words in the plural form shall include the singular, and vice versa, and words importing the masculine gender shall include the feminine. The terms “includes” and “including” do not exclude things not enumerated which are in the same general class [similar to 7701(c) above but with 'same general class' qualifier instead of 'otherwise within the meaning of the term defined']."
here's another:
- 27 CFR § 447.11 - Meaning of terms.
"When used in this part [specific location] and in forms prescribed under this part [specific forms], where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof [we saw that exact phrase at 7701(a)], terms shall have the meanings ascribed in this section [same instructions as above]. Words in the plural form shall include the singular, and vice versa, and words imparting the masculine gender shall include the feminine. The terms “includes” and “including” do not exclude other things not enumerated which are in the same general class or are otherwise within the scope thereof." [shown here with the 'same general class' and 'within the scope thereof' qualifiers.]
So, look, I can do this all day. I've shown you a couple of court rulings and a couple of code references. I can go more, you tell me how many you need before you see a pattern.
I get it, legalese is difficult to parse. But I have a couple of decades of practice.
For you to claim that terms mean the same as the commonly used words is very naive. Even your example above proved my point.
Can you just imagine how incredibly chaotic it would be to even attempt to administer the vast library of laws and regulations without a very high attention to detail?